The Ukraine paradoxes: Russia, reciprocity and reality

In 1939, Winston Churchill described the Soviet Union as “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.” Were he alive today, Churchill might regard the war in Ukraine as “a quagmire, wrapped in danger, inside a dual paradox.” This dual paradox represents two sides of the same geostrategic coin on which the future outcome of that war rests.

One side is how or whether Ukraine and the West will deal with Russia now and whenever the war ends. The other equally daunting side is reciprocity and whether Russia will remain a sanctuary safe from major Ukrainian attack while its military continues purposeful terror strikes on Ukraine’s civilian power, water and food infrastructure.

The Russian paradox is clear: Can or should Russia be held liable and accountable for its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine? Over the long term, should the West punish Russia, possibly by isolating it? Are reparations from Russia for reconstruction that could run into the hundreds of billions of euros justified? And does the same logic apply to war crimes tribunals and bringing guilty parties to justice?

Or can Russia be excused from responsibility for destroying much of an independent state; committing war crimes and atrocities; and breaking treaties and international law on the basis that confrontation could bring a worse outcome? A defeated Russia could implode as it did in 1917 and 1991. But the consequences for the West could be even more dire than were posed by the USSR if it metastasized into greater economic, political and even military conflict.  

From a rules-based, legal and moral perspective, failure to hold Moscow fully accountable is patently wrong. Yet, forcing Russia to confront reparations and war crimes would require some form of surrender or a major regime change in Moscow.

The second critical paradox is reciprocity. Russia is obliterating Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. Unsurprisingly, the West is silent about the parallels between these infrastructure attacks and the Allies’ strategic bombing campaigns against Nazi Germany and Japan. But the Allies did not start World War II.

Why should Ukraine not reciprocate by denying Russia any sanctuary from direct attack? The White House argues for caution and not escalating the war beyond Ukraine’s borders. But suppose the only way for Ukraine to counter Russia’s bombing campaign and end the war is to strike Russia’s homeland. 

The paradox is self-evident. Allow Russia to punish Ukrainian civilians as the means to force Kyiv to capitulate and end the war on Moscow’s terms. Or allow Ukraine to attack targets inside Russia not only with a handful of drones directed against military facilities but against its infrastructure, risking escalation. At this stage, there are no solutions for and even interest in unraveling these dual paradoxes.

Winter is influencing the war in Ukraine. Denial of power, water and food will take its toll. No matter how courageous and determined Ukrainians may be, at some stage the necessities of life will affect political will. A race between destroying and repairing this infrastructure is unlikely to be won by the latter, as a simple cost-exchange ratio favors the attacker.

What to do? Recognizing and beginning informed debate on both paradoxes is a starting point. Neither the Biden nor Zelensky administrations have publicly declared a realistic exit strategy or credible plan for ending the war. Retaking all the Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia, including Crimea, seems several bridges too far. And perhaps far more damage must be inflicted on the Russian army before Moscow comes to terms.

Will these paradoxes and questions be addressed in time to influence the outcome of the war in terms favorable for Ukraine and the West? Has the U.S. been too cautious in limiting the transfer of offensive weapons able to strike Russia? Is the threat of escalation serious enough to contain the war to inside Ukraine with few exceptions? Or is carrying the war directly to Russia the only effective, if not the riskiest, way of ending it?

If these paradoxes are left to fester and these questions are ignored, the war may remain a quagmire from which Russia and Ukraine cannot or will not be extricated without a forcing function. Under those circumstances is conducting a significant policy review in Washington, Brussels, Kyiv and Moscow even possible before far greater destruction and loss of life compel negotiations? If the answer is no, will that be too late? If yes, what will be different?

2023 could become 1914. That is a risk not worth taking.

Harlan Ullman is senior adviser at the Atlantic Council and the prime author of “shock and awe.” His latest  book is “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large.” Follow him on Twitter @harlankullman.